In Bryant, the plaintiff alleged that her employer discharged her because she was pregnant in violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the OADA, made actionable by Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 1989 OK 22, 770 P.2d 24. The defendant sought and won dismissal of the OADA claim.
In dismissing the claim, the court first acknowledged that the definition of sex provided by the OADA mirrored the original language of Title VII and did not include pregnancy and pregnancy related medical conditions. The court next recognized that the United States Supreme Court held that initially Title VII did not recognize pregnancy as a type of gender discrimination. In fact, this inclusion did not occur until 1978 when Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to include pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions among the circumstances that would constitute gender discrimination. The court next recognized that no similar amendment had been made to the OADA. It further recognized that the plaintiff could not point to any clearly established public policy against pregnancy discrimination. Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s OADA claim.
In this most recent legislative session, hoever, the Oklahoma Legislature fixed the loophole left open in the OADA, clarifying that the OADA does include various forms of pregnancy discrimination in its definition of sex. Pursuant to Senate Bill 1814, the definition of “Sex,” “Because of Sex,” or “Based on Sex” now reads as follows:
“Sex”, “Because of Sex” or “Based on Sex” includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.
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